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Abstract: We study evolutionarily stable outcomes for a class of games that admit
cooperation and conflict as possible Nash equilibria. We make use of two ideas: existing
strategies are more likely to be imitated than new strategies are to be introduced; players
are able to identify opponents’ behavior prior to interaction. The long-run evolutionary
limit is efficient for the case of perfect recognition of opponents’ behavior.  For the case
of imperfect recognition, efficiency is not achieved and long-run outcomes are more
efficient the more accurate is the information. Strategies that emerge in the long-run are
those where players reward opponents who are likely to play the same way, and punish
opponents who are likely to play differently.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study games that admit both cooperative behavior and
opportunistic behavior as possible Nash equilibria.  We utilize a model of evolutionary
learning to determine when one outcome emerges rather than the other.
Our evolutionary model assumes that players learn from other players through a
process of imitation: Typically, when a player changes his behavior he will choose the
best strategy used by other players. Sometimes the player will imitate some other player
regardless of how successful this player is.  In addition, there is a small probability that
the player innovates, that is, introduces a strategy currently not in use by any other player.
We assume that an individual is far more likely to imitate an existing, possibly sub-
optimal, strategy than to adopt a strategy that is not in use by any other player.
Players are matched into pairs to play a symmetric game.  We consider both
global matching, and the local interaction model of Ellison [1993]. Unlike standard pair-
wise matching games, we assume that prior to choosing an action each player receives a
signal that is informative about the opponent’s strategy.  A strategy for a player is a map
from possible signals to actions.  Players must choose a strategy prior to observing the
signal and the chosen strategies determine the probability distribution over signals.  An
interpretation of this recognition-technology is as a model for the detection of ‘rule-of-
thumb’ decision-making: players are committed to a particular rule-of-thumb because it
is too costly to change behavior in any particular match, and furthermore, players can
(perfectly or imperfectly) identify opponents’ rules-of-thumb either because (say) past
interactions are observable or else (say) because such rules manifest themselves
observationally through language or involuntary gestures at the time of the match
(blushing when telling a lie).
Consider the following example. Suppose the underlying game is a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Further suppose that there is a signal that identifies when both players use the
same strategy: that is, both players receive the signal “same” if and only if they choose
the same strategy.  Consider the strategy that takes a cooperative action if the player
observes the “same” signal and a punishment action otherwise.  Clearly, it is optimal for
a player to adopt this strategy when he expects his opponents to use it.  On the other
hand, consider the strategy that defects regardless of signal.  Again, this rule is optimal2
whenever an opponent is expected to use it.  With a sufficiently rich information structure
these games typically have multiple equilibria that resemble the folk theorem of repeated
games.  Our evolutionary model of imitation allows us to characterize the behavior that
emerges in the long-run.
When it is possible to identify the opponent’s behavior without error, we show
that the long-run equilibrium is efficient. If we observe the system through time, we may
also observe brief bursts of conflict in which players attempt to maximize the difference
between their own payoffs and that of players using an opposing strategy.
We also study, albeit in a more restricted set of environments, the long-run
outcome when identification of opposing strategies is imperfect. Here we show that in the
long-run strategies that are informationally dominant emerge. Informational
imperfections lead players to place too much weight on their own self-interest relative to
both the common good and the punishment of opponents. In particular, if information is
sufficiently poor, the static Nash equilibrium of the underlying game emerges as the
unique long-run outcome. There are a variety of intermediate cases in which the intensity
of cooperation and conflict depends on how reliably the opponent’s strategy can be
identified. In some circumstances, the unique long-run equilibrium may actually be worse
than the static Nash equilibrium. In all cases, behavior may be interpreted as the
maximization of an altruistic/spiteful utility function, where the degree of altruism or
spite depends on how likely the opponent is to be the same type.
The idea that players may receive information about their opponent’s behavior
prior to choosing an action appears in Frank [1987]. There is a substantial literature on
evolution with positive assortative matching, where players are more likely to be matched
with others who are playing the same strategies (see Bergstrom [2002]).
Both Robson [1990] and Kim and Sobel [1995] consider a setting where players
can send cheap-talk messages prior to choosing an action.  Kim and Sobel [1995] show
that in pure coordination games with pre-play communication only the efficient
equilibrium emerges as the stable outcome of their evolutionary dynamic.  Kim and Sobel
[1995] also show that for general games there is a large set of evolutionarily stable
outcomes.  Models based on cheap-talk communication face the difficulty that defectors
can mimic the message of a cooperative strategy at no cost.  As a consequence, it
becomes relatively easy to destabilize cooperative behavior.  Binmore and Samuelson3
[1990] analyze evolutionarily stable equilibria played by finite automata.  In their setting,
automata can use initial moves to identify each other.  They provide an equilibrium
refinement that ensures that efficient equilibria emerge in a repeated games setting.  But
as in the case of cheap talk communication, these initial moves of a cooperative machine
are easy to imitate by selfish deviators. Therefore, in our evolutionary framework the
approach of Binmore and Samuelson [1990] would run into the same difficulty as the
cheap talk model.
Pre-play communication in our model is not cheap talk.  Players cannot imitate
the signals of other players without imitating their behavior.  This makes it easier to
sustain cooperative behavior in our model.  As a result, we are able to pin down the long-
run stable outcomes in more complicated games than, for example, the pure coordination
games studied by Kim and Sobel [1995].  In section 6, we briefly consider the case where
strategies can “masquerade” as cooperators while playing a selfish action.  Whether such
a free-riding strategy emerges depends on how costly it is to imitate the signals generated
by other strategies.
Our evolutionary model stems from existing work on evolution in economic
systems. In two influential papers Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993]
showed how introducing random innovations (mutations) into a model of evolutionary
adjustment enables predictions about which of several strict Nash equilibria will occur in
the very long run. Key to this result is the possibility that strategies that perform poorly
may be introduced into the population in sufficient numbers through innovation that they
begin to perform well. Using this method, they and other researchers have been able to
characterize when cooperation will emerge in coordination games using the criterion of
risk dominance. Ellison’s [1993] local interaction model gives a plausible account of how
this evolutionary adjustment can take place over sensible amounts of time.
In this paper, we give a different account of the spread of new strategies.  Once a
player introduces a new strategy, a process of imitation propagates the innovation. We
think this is a plausible account of how new ideas spread. This modified propagation
mechanism also makes it easier to find long-run equilibria.  First, the long-run limit
contains only pure strategies. Second, it is sufficient that a strategy profile beat all others
in pair-wise contests. As we illustrate through examples, this is implied by, but weaker
than, the criterion of ½-dominance proposed by Morris, Rob and Shin [1993].4
There are several other papers that analyze models of imitation and mutation.
Dutta and Prasad [2004] analyze a model that is similar to ours in that it considers both
imitation and mutation of strategies.
3  Dutta and Prasad assume that players choose an
unconstrained best response (when they do not imitate or make errors) while our model
assumes that players choose a best response from the set of strategies used by other
players (a relative best response). More importantly, Dutta and Prasad focus on games
with two strategies while our focus is on games with relatively complex strategy spaces.
Vega-Redondo [1997] analyzes a stochastic process where players imitate the best
strategy of opponents and occasionally mutate to a random strategy.  Our model
essentially takes the evolutionary process of Vega-Redondo [1997] and adds to it random
imitation. The addition of random imitation makes it possible to find a simple
characterization of the limiting distribution. Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked [1998]
consider a model where players imitate neighboring players who earn a high payoff.
They consider a game with two strategies and show that cooperative behavior will
emerge in the long-run evolutionary equilibrium. In contrast to our model, players in their
model do not play a relative best response and the result is sensitive to the form of
interaction. Schlag [1998] considers a multi-armed bandit setting and asks which rule
from a given class of imitation rules maximizes welfare.
Dealing with stochastic evolutionary models more broadly, Bergin and Lipman
[1994] show that the relative probabilities of different types of noise can make an
enormous difference in long-run equilibrium; here our process of imitation gives a
particular theory of how those relative probabilities are determined. Van Damme and
Weibull [1998] study a model in which it is costly to reduce errors, and show that the
standard 2x2 results on risk dominance go through. Johnson, Pesendorfer and Levine
[2000] show how the standard theory can predict the emergence of cooperation in a
trading game with information systems of the type introduced by Kandori [1992b].  By
way of contrast, the modified model of evolutionary learning presented here allows us to
study more complex games.  Finally, Kandori and Rob [1993] have a model in which
winning pair-wise contests is sufficient for a strategy to be the long-run outcome.
                                                
3 Kirman [1993] also considers a model of random imitation and mutation. Kirman’s model differs from
other evolutionary models discussed here in that intentional behavior plays no role.5
However, in their model winning all pair-wise contests implies 1/2-dominance, which is
not true in our applications.
Our model of imitation has a great deal of similarity to the replicator dynamic in
the sense that strategies that are used are more likely to be imitated than those that are
not. In particular, when there is no noise in the system, all pure strategy profiles are
absorbing, just as they are in the replicator dynamic. For this reason also our results have
even more of the flavor of Evolutionary Stable Strategies than is the case with the usual
stochastic model of mutation. A good resource for results on the replicator dynamics and
Evolutionary Stable Strategies, including the relevant case of cheap talk, is Weibull
[1995].
2. The Model and Basic Characterization of Long Run Outcomes
In this section, we develop the basic characterization of long-run outcomes. The
subsequent section applies this result to the game discussed in the introduction.
We study a normal form game played by M players. All players have access to
the same set of pure strategies  ￿ 3  with generic element S . We assume that  ￿ 3  is finite
and denote a profile of pure strategies by  	

￿ M 3 T  . We assume that individual players
play pure strategies from  ￿ 3 . The utility of player I depends on his strategy 
I S  and the
profile T  and is written  	
II UST .
The support of the profile T , denoted SUPP 	 T , is the set of all those strategies
which are used by at least one player (and thus excluding those strategies not used by
anyone in the population). We write  	 S T  for the profile in which all players use the
strategy S  and  T T  for the profile at time T . Starting with an initial profile  ￿ T , the profile
T T  is determined from  ￿ T T ￿  according to the following process of imitation and
innovation.
1)  One player I  is chosen at random from the population of M players. This player only
will be changing his strategy.
2)  With probability #F  player I  chooses from  ￿ SUPP 	 T T ￿  randomly with probabilities
￿ \ 	 I
T PS T ￿ . This is called imitation.
3)  With probability  N F  player I  chooses each strategy from  ￿ 3  with probabilities
	  QS  . This is called innovation: strategies are chosen probabilistically regardless
of how widely used they are (if used at all), or how successful they are.6
4)  With probability  N #FF  player I  randomizes with equal probability
4 among the
strategies that solve
￿ ￿ SUPP￿ ￿ MAX   	
T
I
T S US T T
￿ ￿ ￿ .
This is called a relative best response: it is the best response among those strategies
that are actually used by the particular population.
When   #   our evolutionary model coincides with the model of Vega-Redondo
(1997).  (In that paper the ‘relative best response’ is called ‘imitation’.) Our model is also
closely related to the model of Dutta and Prasad [2004].  The difference is in the
specification of the best response (item (4)). We assume that players choose a relative
best response while their model assumes that players choose an unconstrained best
response.
The process defined above gives rise to a Markov process -  on the state space
	

￿ M 3 . Because innovation has strictly positive probability, the process -  is positively
recurrent, and so has a unique invariant distribution  F N .  We analyze this process as F
goes to zero. Note that when   F l  both the probability of innovation and the
probability of imitation converge to zero.  However, for   N   the probability of
innovation converges to zero at a faster rate than the probability of imitation.
We make two assumptions about imitation. First, we assume that N is larger than
M, the number of players.
Unlikely Innovation: NM  .
The second assumption considers profiles in which players are using different
strategies.  It requires that for any strategy S  in a profile there is a strictly positive chance
of a player who was not playing S  in that profile imitating S .
Connected Imitation If  SUPP 	 S T   and SUPP 	 T  is not a singleton then there is a
player J  such that  J SS v  and  \	  J PST  .
                                                
4 This assumption is to ensure that in degenerate games in which ties are generic all maximizers have a
chance of being played. With a finite population and generic utility, ties do not occur, and the support will
generally be a singleton.7
Consider a strategy profile T  with the strategy S  and at least one other strategy in
its support.  Connected imitation implies that there is some agent who does not play S
and who has a strictly positive probability of switching to S .  The probability of such a
switch is at least   # F for some strictly positive constant   # .  Repeated application of the
assumption of connected imitation therefore implies that the probability that all players
who do not play S  switch to S  is at least  ￿  	 M # F ￿ .  Since NM   it follows that for
small F this is much more likely than the event that one single player innovates.
These assumptions are maintained throughout the paper.
We view as plausible the idea that imitation is more likely than innovation. The
specific assumption of unlikely innovation is designed to yield sharp theoretical results,
and not an assumption we would defend on empirical grounds. The assumption of
connected imitation requires comment.  Different players, although having access to the
same set of strategies, have different utility functions, and may feel quite differently
about those strategies. Hence, connected imitation in effect says that these differences are
small enough so that imitation remains plausible. In our application below, the underlying
symmetry of the situation means that a strategy that makes sense for one player makes
sense for someone else. Further note that strategies may condition on a player’s role, for
example, cooperate if player 1; defect if player 2. Hence the same strategy may be
sensible to imitate for players with different roles.
The possibility of imitation and the fact that imitation is much more likely than
innovation distinguishes our model from the model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993],
or Young [1993].  Results similar to the ones obtained by those authors would hold in our
model when   #   and when the population is large.
5
We first establish a basic result about the limit distribution as   F l . Unlikely
innovation implies that heterogeneity is less stable than homogeneity. A heterogeneous
population can evolve into a homogeneous population purely through imitation, while a
homogeneous population cannot evolve at all without at least one innovation.  Theorem 1
confirms this intuition by showing that the limit invariant distribution places weight only
on homogeneous populations.
                                                
5 For a large population the difference between the relative best response analyzed here and a true best
response is typically insignificant since a bounded number of innovations ensures that all strategies are
played. Whenever  ￿
￿ SUPP 	 T 3 T ￿   the relative best response is of course a true best response.8
Theorem 1: The limit  ￿ LIM F
F NN l   exists and  	  NT   implies that  	 S TT   for
some S3  .
6
Proof of this, and all results, can be found in the Appendix.  We refer to states T  with
	  NT   as stochastically stable states.  Theorem 1 says that all players use the same
strategy in every stochastically stable state. Hence, our model of imitation leads to
uniformity in the behavior of players.  Although imitation is random, the combination of
random imitation and relative best response ensures uniform behavior in all states that are
stochastically stable.
To get some intuition for Theorem 1 note that by random imitation the Markov
process will occasionally arrive at states where all players choose the same strategy.
Without innovation such states are absorbing because neither imitation nor the relative
best response can introduce a new strategy to the population.  Our assumption “Unlikely
Imitation” ensures that new strategies are introduced sufficiently infrequently so that
only states where all players choose the same strategy can be stochastically stable.
This greatly simplifies the analysis and is the key to our characterization results below.
3. Pair-wise Contests in Matching Games
We now specialize to consider games with an underlying symmetric structure
induced by matching players. We allow both for global matching procedures, and for
local interaction of the type described by Ellison [1993].
Specifically, we suppose an underlying two person utility function   	 IJ US S . In
the global matching model, the normal form utility function is
￿ 	    	  	
M II IJ
J US M U SS T
￿   .
This is the single population matching model that is common in the literature,
7 and like
most of the literature, we simplify by assuming that a player is as likely to be matched
with himself as with another player.
8  Notice that all players are a priori identical, so the
                                                
6 A similar result in the context of genetic algorithms may be found in Dawid [1999].
7 See Hahn [1995] for an extension of the standard model to multiple populations. Friedman [1998]
considers a model in which players are sometimes matched with opponents from the same population and
sometimes with opponents from a different population.
8 Our results would also hold if we assumed that players cannot be matched with themselves. In that case,
we would assume an odd number of players.9
assumption of connected imitation makes sense. We refer to this model as the global
matching model.  In the global matching model, we assume that M is an even number.
We also consider Ellison’s [1993] local interaction model. Here it is assumed that
players are arranged on the circle, so that player   M   is player 1, and that each player
is matched with K  neighbors on either side. That is,
￿
￿ 	   	  	   	  	
II K II IJ IJ
JIK JI US K U SS K U SS T
￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿   .
In the local interaction model, we generally expect the population to be relatively large
compared to the size of neighborhoods. It simplifies proofs considerably, if make an
explicit assumption to this effect, and hereafter we assume  ￿  	 MK  .
Next, we define what it means for one strategy to beat another strategy.  For
 B bb , the mixed strategy that plays S  with probability B and   S  with probability
 B   is denoted by   	  SS BB  .
Definition 1: The strategy S  beats the strategy    S  iff
   	 	     	 	  US S S US S S BB BB    
for all   B b .
Thus, a strategy S  beats   S  if S  yields higher utility against any combination of S  and   S
that puts more weight on S  than on   S .  Our main characterization result (Theorem 2)
will show that a strategy is the unique stochastically stable state if it beats all other
strategies.
The next definition weakens Definition 1 to allow for ties.
Definition 2: The strategy S  weakly beats   S  iff
   	 	     	 	  US S S US S S BB BB    
for all   B   and   	
 	
 ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿     US S S US S S   . The strategy S  is
tied with   S  iff
   	 	    	 	  U S SS U S SS BB BB    
for all  B bb .10
We say that a strategy “beats the field” if it beats every other strategy.
Definition 3: If S beats all   SS v we say that S beats the field. If for all   SS v  either S
weakly beats   S  or is tied with   S  we say that S  weakly beats the field.
Theorem 2 shows that a strategy that beats the field is the unique stochastically
stable state. Moreover, if a strategy weakly beats the field then N must place strictly
positive probability on that strategy.
Theorem 2: In the global matching or local interaction model, if S  beats the field then
	 	  S NT  . If S weakly beats the field then  	 	  S NT  . Moreover, if   	 	  S NT 
then  ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿   	     	 US S S US S S  .
To gain an intuition for Theorem 2, consider a pair of strategies,   SS.  For small
F we can give an approximate upper bound for the probability that the Markov process
moves between  	 S T  and   	 S T . Since players choose a relative best response with
probability close to one, exactly one innovation and enough imitations are required so
that the system will move to   	 S T  in the relative best response dynamic. Otherwise, the
Markov process simply returns to  	 S T . Suppose that one innovation and at least R
imitations are required to move from  	 S T  to   	 S T  and suppose that one innovation and
no more than   RR   imitations are required to move from   	 S T  to  	 S T . Thus, for small
F, the approximate relative likelihood of a transition from  	 S T  to   	 S T  is
	

R N # FF
Similarly, the approximate relative likelihood of a transition from   	 S T  to  	 S T  is
	

￿ R N # FF



















Hence, when   RR   and F is small, we conclude that a transition from  	 S T  to   	 S T  is
far less likely than a transition from   	 S T  to  	 S T .
9
                                                
9 It is known that these types of arguments can not generally be used to prove theorems about the
stochastically stable state.11
The role of the hypothesis that S  beats the field is to insure that   RR   for all   S .
The reason that this is true is different in the two different global and local matching
cases. In the global matching case, since M  is an even number, from the definition of
beating the field, it follows that   RM p , while     RM b , from which it is
apparent that   RR  . In the local matching case, suppose the configuration is such that
all players     ,, , K   A!  are all playing S . In this case we say that T  has
contiguous S  and refer to the players      ,, , K   A!  as the contiguous set of
S . When S  beats the field and T  has contiguous S  then T  converges to  	 S T  in the
relative best response dynamic. This follows because for players in a contiguous set of S
it is never a relative best response to switch away from S , and for players on the border
of a contiguous set it is always a relative best response to switch to S . Starting from
 	 S T  it is therefore sufficient to have one innovation to S  followed by K  imitations to
S  to reach  	 S T  and hence   RK b .  Starting from  	 S T  we must eliminate all
contiguous sets of S  to move to   	 S T . This requires one innovation to   S  and at least
 	  MK   imitations to   S . Therefore,  	
  	  RM K p  . Since we are
assuming that  ￿  	 MK  , it follows again that   RR  .
Notice that the amount of time it takes to get from   S  to S  is inversely related to
the probability. In the local interaction case, this is of order  ￿K F￿ ; in the global case this
is of order  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ M F￿￿ . If the population size is large and F is small then convergence in
the global case is very slow. By contrast, regardless of the population size, convergence
in the local case will be relatively rapid if the number of opponents interacted with is
small. It is for this reason that Ellison [1993] argues that local interaction is a more
plausible model of the spread of ideas through a population.
The hypothesis, that a strategy ‘beats the field’ relates to the idea of ½-dominance
introduced by Morris, Rob and Shin [1993]. The concept of ½-dominance says that when
half or more of the population is playing S  against any other combination of strategies, it
is a best response to play S . The concept here is weaker in two respects: first, S  must
only beat homogeneous opponents, not arbitrary combinations of strategies. Second, S
must win only in the sense of being a relative best-response, it need not actually be a
best-response; a third strategy may actually do better than S , and this is significant as we
will see in examples below. On the other hand, ½-dominance clearly implies winning all
pair-wise contests. So if there is a ½-dominant strategy, we know from Morris, Rob and12
Shin [1993] that it is stochastically stable with respect to the usual evolutionary dynamic,
and that it is also stochastically stable when innovation is unlikely. It should also be noted
that unlike Morris, Rob and Shin [1993], we consider the local case as well as the global
case.
4. Matching Games with Behavioral Types
In this section we apply the just-obtained characterization results to a pair-wise
matching game. Every period, players are matched into pairs to play a symmetric normal
form game. Prior to choosing an action, each player receives a “signal” containing
information about how his opponent will behave in the game. We examine how the long-
run outcome depends upon the amount of information contained in the signals.
The underlying game played in each match is symmetric. The action space for
both players is ! and the payoff of a player who takes action A  and whose opponent
takes action   A  is    	 5AA .
Prior to meeting an opponent, players simultaneously choose a strategy from a
finite set. Strategies serve two roles. First, they influence the information that is generated
about the player and his opponent; and second, they govern behavior as a function of the
generated information.  Formally, let 9  denote a finite set of signals. A strategy for a
player is a map   S9 ! l  and 3  denotes the set of strategies.  If a player chooses
S3   and his opponent chooses   S3   then the player receives signal Y  with
probability \ 	 YS S Q . Signals are private information. In our interpretation, a signal
reflects what the opponent can learn about the player’s behavior prior to the interaction.
We motivate this choice of ‘recognition technology’ as two ways. Strategies
govern the behavior of agents over many matches.  Players are committed to a particular
strategy because it is too costly to change behavior in any particular match.  If a player
could observe the past interactions of an upcoming opponent he, would be able to form a
prediction of how that opponent would behave during their own upcoming match.
Alternatively, it could be assumed that strategies are directly observable. For example, an
individual who rarely lies may blush whenever he is dishonest. Seeing an opponent blush
would indicate that he would be unlikely to be dishonest in future interactions. (This
example is due to Frank (1987)).13
As an example, suppose that  [] 9  . Further assume that   \   	  YS S Q 
if   SS   and   \   	  YS S Q   if   SS v . Thus, if two players meet who use the same
strategy then both receive the signal 0 whereas when two players meet who use different
strategies then both receive the signal 1. In other words, players recognize if their
opponents use the same or a different strategy prior to play. This example is important,
because it turns out that strategies that recognize themselves are likely to emerge in the
long-run equilibrium.
It bears emphasis that the space of signals is necessarily smaller than the set of
strategies: the cardinality of the space of strategies is at least  9 ! , which is greater than
that of 9  provided that there are at least two actions.  This relative coarseness of the
signal space means that it is not possible that a signal could reveal the precise strategy of
an opponent for every possible strategy profile.
If player I uses strategy 
I S  and his opponent uses strategy 
J S  then the expected
payoff of player I is given by
￿  	 	   	 	 \  	 \  	 IJ I J IJ JI
Y9 Y 9 U SS 5 SYSY YSS Y SS QQ
￿￿   .
 We consider three scenarios. In the first – analyzed in section 4.1 – a player is
able to determine with certainty whether his opponents in each match use the same
strategy he does. For this case, we show for a general class of utility functions that an
efficient equilibrium will emerge as the long run outcome. In the second scenario –
analyzed in section 4.2 – we consider the case of noisy identification of opponents’
behavior for a restricted class of utility functions. In that restricted environment, we relate
the degree of cooperation among agents to the ability of agents to identify types who use
similar rules. The model of section 4.2 supposes a great deal of symmetry in the signaling
mechanism.  The third scenario – analyzed in section 4.3 – replaces the symmetry
assumption with an informational dominance condition.
4.1 Perfect Identification
The first scenario assumes that each player can identify with certainty whether an
opponent is using the same strategy.
Assumption 1: There is a 
￿ Y9  such that 
￿ \  	 YS S Q   for every S3   and
￿ \   	  YS S Q   for   SS v .14
The signal 
￿ Y  is generated if and only if the strategies of the two players coincide and
therefore players can identify those opponents who behave in the same way as they do.
Before analyzing the evolutionarily stable outcomes, it is instructive to consider
the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the static two-player game. In that game, each player
simultaneously chooses a strategy S3   and payoffs are given by the payoff function U
defined above.   Let 
￿ A  denote the pure min-max action of the underlying game
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The strategy 
￿ AA S  plays the action A  if the opponent has chosen 
￿ AA S  and the minmax
action 
￿ A  if the opponent has chosen a strategy different from 
￿ AA S .   It is immediate that
the profile 
￿￿  	 AA AA SS constitutes a Nash equilibrium for every action A!   with
￿  	 5AA U p .   Hence, we have the following “folk theorem” for this benchmark game.
Benchmark Theorem: If   	 V5 A A   for some A!   and 
￿ VU p  then V  is a Nash
equilibrium payoff.
Although the game has many Nash equilibria we will show that under our
evolutionary dynamics the outcome is efficient.  To facilitate the analysis, we make two
assumptions on the utility function  5  of the underlying game.  Assumption 2 requires
that there be a (weakly) Pareto optimal symmetric profile.  Let A  be the best symmetric
outcome, i.e.,
ARGMAX   	 A! A5 A A ￿ 
Assumption 2 says that there is no asymmetric profile that is strictly better than    	 AA
for both players.
Assumption 2:    	  	   	  	 5AA 5AA 5A A 5AA ºb15
If there is a public randomization device then Assumption 2 is always satisfied if
we include actions that may depend on the outcome of the public randomization.  In that
case, we can use a coin flip to decide which player is the row player and which player is
the column player.  Once roles are assigned, players choose the Pareto optimal actions.
Assumption 3 requires that there is an action A!   that ensures that the player
gets a payoff that is at least as large as the payoff of his opponent.
Assumption 3: There is an A!   such that  	  	  5AA 5AA p  for all A!  .
Note that the payoff difference   	   	 5A A 5AA   defines a symmetric zero-sum
game and hence has a (possibly mixed) minmax strategy.  Assumption 3 says that this
minmax strategy is an element of !, that is, the game defined by the payoff differences
has a pure minmax strategy.  Assumption 3 is always satisfied if we include the possibly
mixed minmax action as one of the elements of !.
Let 
￿  AA SS  . Hence, the strategy 
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When the opponent plays 
￿ S , the strategy 
￿ S  takes the Pareto efficient symmetric action.
When the opponent does not play 
￿ S  the strategy 
￿ S  chooses the punishment action A .
Note that the punishment action maximizes the minimum difference between the player’s
payoff and his opponent’s payoff.  Assumption 2 implies that for every A! 
 	 	  5AA 5AA p  and therefore action A  is indeed a punishment.
Theorem 3 shows that the long run outcome of the evolutionary dynamics will put
positive probability on the strategy  ￿ S . Moreover, every other strategy S  that is used with
positive probability leads to a payoff similar to the payoff of 
￿ S : when S  meets S  both
players receive the payoff   	 5AA; when S  meets  ￿ S  both players receive the same
payoff.
Theorem 3:  ￿ 	  S N  . If  	  S N   then  ￿￿  	   	  	 USS US S 5AA   and
￿￿  	   	 USS US S  .
Theorem 3 implies that if A  is the unique symmetric Pareto optimal outcome and
if  	  	  5AA 5AA   for all AA v  then the optimal punishment strategy is the unique
outcome in the long-run limit.  This will be the case in a generic game that satisfies16
Assumptions 2 and 3.  Otherwise, there may be two or more strategies that are long-run
stable.  Note that if we observe the system for a long time we will typically observe each
player using the same long-run stable strategy and all players receiving the payoff
 	 5AA. However, occasionally there will be a transition from one long-run stable
strategy to another. During this brief period of transition, players using different
strategies will punish one another.
The proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix shows that strategy  ￿ S  weakly beats the
field, that is; it weakly beats every other strategy.  Let us briefly explain the role of the
Assumptions in proving this.  Assumption 1 guarantees that players can detect when
opponents use a strategy that differs from their own.  Assumptions 2 and 3 allow us to
construct an optimal punishment strategy that punishes all opponents who use a different
strategy with the same action.  Assumption 3 implies that the action A  maximizes the
payoff difference between a player and his opponent irrespective of the action chosen by
the opponent.  Assumption 2 implies that deviating to an asymmetric profile cannot
increase everybody’s payoff and therefore  ￿ S  is a best response to itself. Without
Assumption 3 the optimal punishment could depend on the particular strategy S  used by
other players.  In that case, a long-run stable outcome will depend on the details of the
information environment 	 9 Q .   If Assumption 2 were violated then there might be an
action A!   such that   	 	 5AA 5AA  .   In that case,  ￿ S  would reward a deviation to
a strategy that always plays A  and – obviously – the result would fail.   Assumption 2
seems natural given that our model considers single population dynamics.  For games in
which all Pareto optimal action profiles are asymmetric it seems more appropriate to
consider an evolutionary model with two distinct populations of players, one
corresponding to row players and the other corresponding to column players.
Note that the strategy  ￿ S  need not be ½ dominant.  Suppose that the underlying
game is a Prisoner’s dilemma and let S  be a constant strategy that always plays “defect”.
Suppose, moreover, that there are signals that enable a strategy  S  to play “defect”
against  ￿ S  and “cooperate” against S .  As defined above, 
￿ S  plays  “cooperate” against
￿ S  and the “defect” otherwise.  Against  ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ SS   the strategy S  does better than  ￿ S
and therefore  ￿ S  is not ½ dominant. Note that the strategy  S  seems to serve no useful
purpose except to make S  look good against  ￿ S . Our theory of infrequent innovation
provides a rigorous account of why we should not expect such strategies to play a role in17
determining the long-run equilibrium: because they do not themselves do well against  ￿ S
they will not remain around long enough for players to discover that they should play S .
4.2 Gift Exchange and Imperfect Identification
The long-run stable strategy identified in the previous section has a simple binary
form.  It uses a single cooperative action when it meets an opponent who uses the same
strategy and it uses a single punishment action for opponents who use a different strategy.
To obtain this simple form, it is necessary that agents be able to identify deviators
(opponents who use a different strategy) without error.
Such a simple strategy is no longer optimal when deviations cannot be detected
without error.  In that case, the punishment or reward must take into account the
likelihood of facing a deviator.  In this section, we analyze the case of imperfect
identification for the special case of an additively separable payoff structure.
We assume that each action A  has a cost  	 CA  and yields a benefit  	 BA  for the
opposing player.  The payoff of a player who takes action A  and whose opponent
chooses action   A  is
  	   	 	 5AA BA CA                                                   (1)
We assume that  	  CA p , with  e 	  CA   for some action  e A!  .  Note that the utility
function (1) satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3.  The payoff structure defined in (1) implies
that the effect of a player’s action on the opponent’s payoff is independent of the action
taken by the opponent.  This feature of the payoffs will allow us to determine the long-
run stable outcomes under our evolutionary dynamics; without it, optimal punishments
will generally depend on opponents’ strategies, and we do not get a clear result
We can interpret this game as describing a situation where two players meet and
have an opportunity to exchange goods. The function C  denotes the cost of the good to
the giving player and B  describes the benefit of the good for the receiving player.  Games
with this utility function resemble a prisoner’s dilemma in that the cost minimizing action
is dominant.
Assumption 4 describes the information structure analyzed in this section.
 Assumption 4:18
	 I F Å 
\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Thus,  	 PY  describes the probability that a player receives the signal Y  if he and his
opponent use the same strategy whereas  	 QY  describes the probability when the two
players use different strategies. Suppose the prior probability that a player uses S  is B
and that he receives the signal Y .  Then, the posterior probability that the opponent will
play according to S  is
	






This posterior is greater than B when  	 	 PY QY   and less than B when  	 	 QY PY  .
We begin by analyzing the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the static two-player
game.  As in the previous section, each player simultaneously chooses a strategy S3   .
Suppose the strategy S   satisfies
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
99
PSY BSY CA QSY BSY p                                    (IC)
Inequality (IC) says that a player who plays S  receives a higher payoff than a player who
always plays the cost minimizing action e A . (Recall that  e 	  CA  ).  Since the
information system sends the same signals for every deviation from S , a player who
wishes to deviate will always do best by deviating to the cost minimizing strategy.
Consequently, the inequality (IC) is necessary and sufficient for S3   to constitute a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Benchmark Theorem: The strategy S3   is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and
only if it satisfies (IC).
The strategy that chooses the cost minimizing action for every signal is always a
Nash equilibrium.  If the signal is uninformative (PQ  ) then this will be the only
equilibrium.  If the signal is informative and the benefits of exchange are sufficiently
great then there will be Nash equilibria in which gift exchange takes place.
Next, we characterize the long-run stable outcome implied by our evolutionary
model. The strategy 
￿ S  is defined as follows.  For every signal Y  the action 
￿	 SY solves
                        M A X ;	 	 =	 ;	 	 =	
A!PY QY BA PY QY CA
￿                                  (*)19
We assume that the maximization problem (*) has a unique solution for every  Y .  The
strategy 
￿ S  rewards opponent types when  	 	 PY QY   and punishes opponent types
when  	 	 QY PY  .  In the limiting case where the type allows no inference about his
play ( 	 	 PY QY  ) the strategy 
￿ S  minimizes the cost C .
Theorem 4, proven in the Appendix, shows that 
￿ S  is the unique long-run
outcome.
Theorem 4:  ￿ 	  S N  .
To prove Theorem 4 we show that 
￿ S  weakly beats the field and that
￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  	   	 US S S US S S   implies 
￿ SS  .  Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2
to get the desired conclusion.  Theorem 4 uses the special structure of the gift-exchange
game to find an optimal punishment strategy that “works” irrespective of the behavior of
the opponent.   In particular, the simple characterization of the long-run outcome depends
on the fact that the impact of a player’s action on his opponent’s payoff is independent of
the opponent’s action.  The separability of payoffs assumed in this section plays a role
similar to the role played by Assumption 3 in the previous section.  Without the separable
payoffs, the optimal punishments and rewards could depend on the strategy of the
opponent. In that case, there may be no strategy that weakly beats the field and hence our
characterization theorem could not be applied.
Under our interpretation of the environment as gift exchange game, the gift is
decreasing as the signal indicates an opponent who is more likely to play a different
strategy.  It is worth emphasizing that in a long-run stable outcome typically all players
are choosing the same strategy. Hence, the probability that a player is using 
￿ S  is one,
irrespective of the realization of the signal.  Nevertheless, players will punish each other
for appearing to be different. This implies that the equilibrium is inefficient.  In contrast
to the case of Theorem 3, where a socially efficient payoff was realized in the long-run
stable outcome, here inefficiencies persist in the long-run because players respond to
signals as if one-half of the population were using a different strategy and hence needed
to be punished.
4.3 Informational Dominance
In Theorem 4 every strategy generates the same information.  We now relax that
assumption and consider strategies that may differ in their ability to identify the behavior20
of opponents.  For example, a strategy may have an advantage in determining whether an
opponent uses the same strategy.  Alternatively, a strategy may be good at masquerading
and hence be hard to distinguish from other strategies.
Specifically, consider the optimal punishment strategy 
￿ S  defined above. This
strategy uses a symmetric information structure defined by 	 PQ  and therefore generates
the same information for every opponent who does not use 
￿ S . We continue to suppose
that 
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However, for strategies other than 
￿ S  we now drop Assumption 4 and allow general
signal distributions  \	 S Q ¸¸ .  Nevertheless, we show that if 
￿ S  is informationally
dominant, it emerges as a long run outcome.
Consider a situation where only strategies 
￿ S  and S  are played. Strategy 
￿ S  is
informationally superior to strategy S  if the signal generated by 
￿ S  provides better
information about the opponent’s strategy than the signal generated by S .  The signal
generated by 
￿ S  provides better information (in the sense of Blackwell (1954)) than the
signal generated by S  if there is a non-negative matrix
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￿ S  is informationally dominant, if it is informationally superior to
every other strategy S .  Note that informational dominance only requires that strategy 
￿ S
generates better information in situations where 
￿ S  and one other competing strategy are21
played.  Thus, 
￿ S  may be an informationally dominant strategy even though strategy S
does better at identifying a third strategy S .
A trivial example of an informationally dominant strategy is a strategy that cannot
be distinguished from any other strategy.  In that case, 
￿ \	 \ 	 YS S YS S QQ   for all S
and hence strategy 
￿ S  is informationally dominant even if strategy 
￿ S  does not generate
any information, that is,  	 	 PY QY   for all Y .  This is a case where strategy 
￿ S  is
informationally dominant because it successfully masquerades as other strategies.
Theorem 5 shows that when strategy 
￿ S  is informationally dominant, it emerges
as an outcome of the long-run stable distribution. Moreover, every strategy that is a long-
run stable outcome is similar to strategy 
￿ S  in payoff. In particular, if  	  S N   then the
payoff when S  meets S  is the same as the payoff when 
￿ S  meets 
￿ S .  
Theorem 5: If  ￿ S  is informationally dominant then  ￿ 	  S N  . Moreover, for every
strategy S  with  	  S N   we have that 
￿￿  	   	 USS US S   and that 
￿￿  	   	 USS US S  .
In this section, we have restricted the informationally dominant strategy to
generate symmetric information, that is, to generate the same information for every
opponent.  This allowed us to identify a behavior (a map from signals to actions) that is
successful against every opponent. The symmetry assumption in this section is therefore
more than a convenience. It implies that strategy 
￿ S  is informationally superior to every
other strategy with a uniform interpretation of the signals.  If we were to forego this
symmetry assumption we would need to replace it with a requirement that would
preserve this uniformity. For example, we could assume that there is a reference strategy
S  such that any signal realization generated by 
￿ S  against an arbitrary opponent is at least
as informative as it is against strategy S .  Informational dominance would then require
that the signal generated against S  be informationally superior to the signal generated by
any opponent.
4.4 Examples
We conclude this section by illustrating Theorems 4 and 5 in the following four
examples.
Example 1: First, consider the case where every strategy uses the same symmetric
information structure 	 PQ  and hence Theorem 4 applies.  Moreover, there is a signal 
￿ Y22
with the property that 
￿￿ 	   	  PY QY  , that is, players can perfectly identify if their
opponents use the same strategy. In such a case Theorem 4 is of course a special case of
Theorem 3.  If a player uses strategy 
￿ S  and meets a player who also uses 
￿ S , then both
players are assigned the type 
￿ Y .  Since 
￿￿ 	   	  PY QY  , the action taken by both
players solves
MAX  	  	
A !BA CA
￿ 
Note that  	 	 BA CA   is the social benefit of action A  and hence we have an efficient
outcome in this case.  If a player uses a strategy other than 
￿ S  then his opponent receives
the signal 
￿ YY v .  Hence  	  PY  , and so 
￿ S  punishes the player by choosing the
action that solves
M A X 	 	 M I N 	 	
A !A ! BA CA BA CA
￿￿   
Note that this action maximizes the payoff difference between the two players, as
required by Theorem 3.   Since the punishment action minimizes the sum of a player’s
cost and his opponent’s benefit, that player is willing to incur such a cost since it leads to
a negative payoff for his non-
￿ S  playing opponent.
Example 2.  To the environment of Example 1, we add the strategy S , which can
successfully masquerade as any other strategy.  Thus, a player using strategy S  cannot
distinguish between opponents who use S  or S , so that  \	 \	 YS S YS S QQ   for all
signals   Y9   In addition, players who use S  do not receive informative signals about
their opponents.  Hence, we can describe their information by a symmetric information
structure  	 PQ  with  	 	 PY QY  .  The strategy S  is informationally dominant and
hence we can apply Theorem 5.  Since signals are not informative it follows that S  is a
long-run stable outcome if it takes the least cost action e A  for every signal realization.  In
that case, Theorem 5 implies that every strategy that is a long-run stable outcome must
play the least cost action. Hence, the introduction of a strategy that successfully
masquerades as other strategies eliminates cooperation between players.
Example 3. This example serves to emphasize that  ￿ S  need not be ½ dominant in the
ordinary sense. Consider the environment of Theorem 5 and assume that 
￿ S , the23
informationally dominant long-run strategy, is not constant.  Let S  be a constant strategy
that always plays e A . Suppose also that there are signals that enable a strategy  S  to
identify S  with certainty and to choose an action that maximizes B . Otherwise,  S
chooses  e A .  For an appropriate choice of B , the strategy S  does better than  ￿ S  against
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ SS   and therefore  ￿ S  is not ½ dominant.
Example 4: Consider a symmetric two-signal scenario,  [] 9   and
	 	   PQP P p.  If the signal is  Y   then this is an indication that the two
players are using the same strategy whereas if the signal is   Y   it is an indication that
the strategies are different. Suppose there are three actions  [     ] A  ,
￿ 	 	  BA ACA A A C   . This is a trading game with a cooperative action (  A  ), a
no-trade action (  A  ), and a hostile action (  A  ). Both the hostile and the
cooperative action are costly for players, whereas the no-trade action is costless.   In this












then in the unique long-run outcome players choose the cooperative action when the






then in the unique long-run outcome players take the no trade action when the signal is  0
and the hostile action when the signal is 1. In this case, the long run outcome is therefore
worse than the unique equilibrium of the normal form game. Players choose no trade and
hostility and do not realize any of the gains from trade.
This example points out a significant non-monotonicity. Suppose that  C  .
Then when   P   we are in the second, cooperative, case. When P approaches ½ we are
in the first no trade case. But for intermediate values of P, for example   P  , we are24
in the final case where efficiency is actually less than the autarkic solution that occurs
when P approaches ½.
5. The Masquerade
A standard and fundamental question about systems in which strategies are
directly observable is why evolution does not favor free-riding strategies that pretend to
be something they are not. In particular, our results imply that a free-riding strategy that
can perfectly mimic other strategies must be the long-term winner. If free-riding is not to
emerge in the very long-run then it must in some respect be costly.
A good general discussion of the issue of free-riding and selfishness can be found
in Bergstrom [2002]. To ask why we do not see only free-riding masqueraders we return
to the standard environment of perfect identification and focus on the special case of gift
exchange games. In this environment, we have shown that the unique stochastically
stable outcome is the optimal punishment strategy that is altruistic towards itself and
spiteful towards other strategies. Implicitly, we have assumed that such a masquerade is
infinitely costly to implement. However, if there were a strategy that sent exactly the
same signal as the optimal punishment strategy, but behaved selfishly in each match, then
it would be the strategy to emerge as the long-term winner rather than the optimal
punishment strategy.
The most interesting case to consider is the intermediate one in which a
masquerade is neither costless nor infinitely costly. Recall the assumption of perfect
identification: a signal  ￿ Y  such that 
￿ \  	 YS S Q   and 
￿ \   	  YS S Q   for   SS v . The
strategy  ￿ S  is called the optimal punishment strategy. Let the action
ARGMAX   	 M
A A5 A A   be the best response to altruism. Let us add to this environment
a single free-riding strategy  M S  with the property that  	 MM SY A   and  ￿ \ 	 M YS S Q 
for all S3  . The free-riding strategy perfectly mimics ever other strategy and exploits
the optimal punishment strategy to the maximum extent possible. Utility to the strategy
M S  is given by    	 5AA Y  , where   Y   is the cost of masquerading. Then the optimal
punishment strategy will continue to beat the field provided it can beat the free-riding
strategy. 
Theorem 6: If MAX[   	   	   	   	] MM M M 5A A 5AA 5A A 5AA Y  b  then  ￿ S  beats the
field.25
Proof: The optimal punishment strategy earns
￿￿    	 	  	   	  	 MM US S S 5AA 5AA BB B B   
while the free-riding strategy gets
￿    		  	  	 	 MM M M M US S S 5A A 5A A BB B B Y     ,
from which the results follows directly.
;
The implication of this seems clear enough: we would not expect strategies to
evolve that tell “small lies,” that is costly lies with little benefit. However, we might
expect that highly evolved strategies will tell low cost lies that have a large benefit. No
one expects a defendant in a murder trial to admit that he committed the murder.
Witnesses with less at stake are viewed as more likely to tell the truth.
A particularly significant aspect of this theory is what it implies for games where
cooperation is enforced by punishments off the equilibrium path. Consider for example, a
simple noisy prisoner’s dilemma game followed by a “punishment round.” In this game,
there is a gift that costs one to give. The gift is worth '  and if it is given it is received
with probability  P  . In the second round, each player may optionally impose a penalty
of  0  on the other player at a cost of # . Assume that   0   and
 	  	  P' P# 0 p  . Then, the optimal punishment strategy is to give the gift and
punish if a gift is not received in turn.  The best-response to the optimal punishment
strategy is not to punish, and
 	   	 	  	 MM M M 5A A 5AA 5A A 5AA P #    .
If the signal is not very noisy, then P# Y   and it would not be worth employing the
free riding strategy.
Appendix
Below we interpret  N  as the measure describing the limit of the invariant
distributions of the perturbed (  F  ) Markov process.
Let  ￿ N  be an irreducible invariant measure of the Markov process in which
 F  . Let  X  be the set of profiles in the state space 	

￿ M 3  that this invariant
distribution gives positive weight to. We call such an  X  an ergodic set. Let 8  be the set26
of all such  X .   Note that this is a set of sets. Let SUPP 	 T  denote the set of pure
strategies in the support of T . First we establish some basic facts about  8 .
Lemma A1: (1)    XX X X 8º  ; (2) If   TT X  8  then
SUPP 	 SUPP 	 TT  ; (3) [	 ] S T 8 for all 
￿ S3  .
Proof:  When   F   we have the relative best-response dynamic in which one player
switches with equal probability to one of the relative best-responses to the current state.
The sets  X  are by definition minimal invariant sets under the relative best-response
dynamic. That these sets are disjoint is immediate from the definition. Pure profiles are
absorbing since no strategy can be used unless it is already in use. This means that every
set  X  consisting of a singleton pure profile is in 8 . To see that SUPP 	 SUPP 	 TT  ,
observe that the relative best-response dynamic cannot ever increase the set of strategies
in use. If there is a point  SUPP 	 SUPP 	 SS TT   then the probability that the relative
best-response dynamic goes from T  to   T  is zero, which is inconsistent with the two
strategies lying in the same ergodic set.
;
Lemma A1 (2) implies that for each  X 8 we may assign a unique set of pure
strategies  	 3 X  corresponding to SUPP 	 TT X  .
To prove our results, we will use the characterization of  N  given by Young
[1993].
10 Let  U  be a tree whose nodes are the set  8 . We denote by  	 UX  the unique
predecessor of  X . An  X -tree is a tree whose root is  X . For any two points   XX8 
we define the resistance  	 R XX   as follows. First, a path from  X  to  X   is a sequence of
points  ￿  	 + TT ! with  ￿ TX  ,  + TX    and  ￿ K T ￿  reachable from  K T  by a single
player changing strategy. If the change from  K T  to  ￿ K T ￿  is a relative best-response, the
resistance of  K T  is 0; if the change is an imitation the resistance is 1; if the change is an
innovation the resistance is N . The resistance of a path is the sum of the resistance of
each point in the sequence. The resistance  	 R XX   is the least resistance of any path from
X  to  X  . The resistance  	 R U  of the  X -tree  U  is the sum over non-root nodes of
	 	 R XUX  . The resistance of  X ,  	 R X  is the least resistance of any  X -tree. The
following Theorem is proved in Young [1993].
                                                
10 Although the standard convention in game theory is that a tree begins at the root, Young [1993] followed
the mathematical convention that it ends there. We have used the usual game-theoretic convention, so our
trees go in the opposite direction of Young’s.27
Young’s Theorem:  LIM F NN   exists and  	  NX   if and only if
	 M I N 	 RR X XX ￿8  ￿ 
Remark: The set of  X  for which  	  NX   is called the stochastically stable set.
The basic tool for analyzing  N  is tree surgery, by which we transform one tree
into another and compare the resistances of the two trees. Suppose that  U  is an  X -tree.
For any nodes  XX v   we cut the  X  -subtree separating the original tree into two trees;
one of which is the  X  -subtree and the other that which is left over. This reduces the
resistance by  	 	 R XUX  . If  X   is a node in either of the two trees, and  e X  is the root of
the other tree, we may paste  e X  to  X   by defining  e	 UX X   . This tree has the root of
the tree containing  X  . The paste operation increases the resistance by  e 	 R XX  , so the
new tree has resistance  	  e  	 	 	 RR R UX XX U X    . These operations can be used to
characterize classes of least resistance trees, by showing that certain operations do not
increase resistance. They can also be used (as below) in proofs by contradiction, showing
that certain trees cannot be least-resistance because it is possible to cut and paste in such
a way as to reduce resistance.
Theorem 1:   LIM F NN  exists and  	  NX   implies that  [	 ] S XT   for some  ￿ S3  .
Proof: Existence of N follows from Young’s theorem. Suppose that  	  NX   and that
X  is not a singleton pure profile. Let  U  be a least resistance  X -tree. Let  [	 ] S XT    be
a singleton pure strategy that is in some TX  , that is,  	 S3 X  . Cut  X   and paste the
root X to it. Since  X   is a singleton pure profile, it requires at least one innovation to go
anywhere, so that cutting it reduces resistance by at least N . On the other hand, since
TX   and  	 S3 X  , we can go from  X  to  X   by no more than M  imitations, so that
pasting the root to  X   increases resistance by at most M . By the assumption of unlikely
innovation (that is, NM  ), this implies that the new tree has strictly less resistance than
the old tree, thus contradicting Young’s Theorem.
;
In what follows we simplify notation by writing  	 NT 	  instead of  [ ]	 NT.
Theorem 2:  In the global matching or local interaction model, if S  beats the field then
  		  S NT  . If S weakly beats the field then    		  S NT  . Moreover, if   	 	  S NT 
then  ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿   	     	 US S S US S S  . .28
Proof: The proof is in two parts, concerning first the strict case and then the week case.
1. Strict Case: Suppose that there is some  X  with  	  NX  . By Theorem 1,
[ 	 ] S XT   for some pure strategy   S . Let  U  be the least resistance of the  X -tree. If
[	 ] S T  is not the root, we may suppose that it is attached to some  X  , and consider
cutting it and pasting the root to it. We now have two different arguments depending on
whether matching is global or local.
Global Case: Considering first a transition from  	 S T  to   	 S T , it takes at least
one innovation combined with (since S  beats any point in  X  )   M  imitations to arrive
at  X  . So this reduces resistance by at least   NM  . Considering next the reverse
transition from   	 S T  to  	 S T , since S  beats   S  such a transition can be accomplished
with one innovation and no more than  	   M   imitations.  So resistance is strictly
reduced under this combined operation thus leading to a contradiction of Young’s
Theorem.
Local Case: As in the intuitive discussion in the text, when the configuration is
such that all players     ,, , K   A!  are all playing S  we say that the state has
contiguous S .  We reiterate the observation that when S  beats the field, a state with
contiguous S  is in the basin of  	 S T : the players in a contiguous set of S  never find it a
relative best response to switch from S , and players on the border of a contiguous set
always find it a relative best response to switch to S .  Starting from  	 S T  we must
eliminate all contiguous sets of S  in order to be able to exit the basin of  	 S T . This
requires at least   	 MK   players switching to a different strategy. So cutting [	 ] S T
from  X   reduces resistance by at least 	
  	  MK  . On the other hand, starting
from   	 S T , it is sufficient (following an innovation into S ) for K  players to switch to S
in order to be able to establish a contiguous set and hence a basin of  	 S T . In this case
resistance will have been increased by at most K . Given the assumption made in the
main body of the article that  ￿  	 MK  , it follows that resistance has been strictly
reduced by this combined operation, thus leading to the contradiction of Young’s
Theorem.
2. Weak Case: In this case we can only conclude (for both global and local interaction)
that resistance is not increased after our tree-cutting operation. This conclusion then29
implies that [	 ] S T  must be at the root of a least-cost tree, giving us    		  S NT   as
required.
If we have   	 	  S NT   and  ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿   	     	  U S SS U S SS  v  (note the
inequality here) then, since S  weakly beats the field by assumption, it follows that S
beats   S . From this we can conclude that [  	] S T  cannot be the root of a least cost tree,
and so it must be that   	 	  S NT  , thus proving the last statement in the theorem.
;
Theorem 3: (1)  ￿  	 	  S NT  . (2) If    		  S NT   then  ￿￿  	  	 	  	 5SY SY 5AA   and
	  	 	 	 5SY A 5ASY   for all Y  such that 
￿ \ 	  YSS Q  .
Proof:  We first show that  ￿ S  weakly beats the field.  Suppose that  ￿ SS v . Let
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Since this expression is linear in B, to show that S  weakly beats the field, it suffices to
show that it is non-negative both for  ￿
￿ B   and   B  . When  ￿
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The first term is non-negative by the definition of A ; the second term is non-negative by
Assumption 3.  For   B  , we have
￿ ￿   	   	   	 MAX   	 A! US S USS 5AA 5A A BB ￿ p
Assumption 3 implies    	   	 5AA 5A A p  for all   A!   and Assumption 2 implies
 	 M I N [  	   	 ] 5AA 5AA 5A A p .  Hence, it follows that   	  	  5AA 5A A p  for all
 A!   which shows that  ￿ S  weakly beats the field.  Theorem 2 therefore implies that






  	   	
  	   	 [    		   	 	]   	
Y9
US S USS
5AA 5AA 5ASY 5SY A YSS Q
￿

p   30
From the definitions of A  and A  as well as from the expression above, we see that this is
possible only if  	  	 5AA 5AA   and  	  	 	 	 5SY A 5ASY   for all T  with
￿  	 YSS Q  .
;
Theorem 4:  ￿ 	  S N  .
Proof:  Theorem 4 follows from Theorem 5 (proved below) since the action that defines
￿	 SY is unique.  In particular, Theorem 5 implies that    		  S NT   if and only if
￿ 	 	 SY S Y   for all Y9   and therefore    		  S NT   implies  ￿ SS 
;
Theorem 5: If  ￿ S  is informationally dominant then, ￿  	 	  S NT  . Moreover, for every
strategy  	 S T  with    		  S NT   we have 
￿￿  	   	 USS US S   and 
￿￿  	   	 USS US S  .
Proof:  We first show that  ￿ S  weakly beats the field. Let  ￿  	 SS S B BB    for some
S3  . We must show that  ￿  	   	  US S USS BB p  for  ￿
￿ ;  	 B  . Since
￿  	   	 US S USS BB   is linear in B it suffices to show that it is non-negative at both
￿
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where the last inequality follows since 
￿	 SY maximizes
<> <> 	 	 	 	 	 	 PY QY BA PY QY CA  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where the inequality follows from  	  CA p .  Recall that there is an action  e A  with
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Y9
US S USS PY QY BA
￿
p   
where the last equality follows from  	 	  PY QY   .  This shows that 
￿ S  weakly
beats the field.
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￿	 SY is the unique optimal action it follows that for   ZY M  , 
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An analogous argument shows that 
￿￿ 	  	 US S USS  .
;32
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